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Abstract: Using a neoclassical monetary model, we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that
operates as a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system. We illustrate how the cost of such systems does not
ultimately derive from factors such as “payments gridlock” but instead from the credit constraints imposed by
RTGS. We also investigate the welfare consequences of various approaches to the allocation of daylight credit
by central banks. The two most popular approaches, collateralization and charging an administered intraday
interest rate, are shown to be effective along some dimensions but flawed in others.
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Real-Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy
Large-value or wholesale payment systems are a vital component of all developed
economies. The two large wholesale payments systems in the U.S., Fedwire and CHIPS, account
for $2.6 trillion of transactions daily. Fedwire is used to transmit most large-value transactions in
the U.S., including transactions associated with settling retail payment systems such as checks
and credit cards, and also including settlement transactions for most financial markets. CHIPS is
used primarily to settle the dollar legs of foreign exchange transactions.
1
Recent years have seen a rapid expansion in the volume of wholesale payments world-
wide. Since all wholesale payment systems settle on the books of central banks, this expansion
has caused central banks to reexamine the advantages and disadvantages of the various types of
arrangements for settlement. Central banks have become increasingly aware of the risk inherent
in provision of subsidized credit, given the presence of moral hazard or asymmetric information.
The response has been a general shift towards real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems.
2 A
real-time gross settlement system is a payment system in which all payments take the form of
transfers of central bank funds from the account of paying bank to the receiving bank. (By con-
trast, under a multilateral net settlement system, payment messages are exchanged continuously,
and participants’ net positions vis-à-vis all other participants are settled on a periodic basis, usu-
ally at the close of business.)
In almost all RTGS systems, central banks provide intraday credit to participating banks.
The terms for such credit vary from system to system, though recent concerns with credit risk
have meant that in most cases, credit is only available in limited amounts or at some cost. In
some systems, interest is charged for intraday credit, though at an administered rate rather than at
a market rate. Collateral of various types may be required before credit is granted.2
The argument in favor of central banks’ provision of intraday credit in a RTGS system is
that otherwise RTGS would impose undue costs on banks and on their customers.
3 The holding
of liquid assets is costly to the participating banks. When they economize on these holdings, it
limits the availability of reserves. In many RTGS systems, it is claimed, limited reserves cause
delays in the processing of payments as banks wait to amass the reserves required to effect pay-
ments. Thus, a RTGS regime without intraday credit provision is often said to involve a loss of
liquidity and immediacy.
The social balance between the costs and benefits of publicly provided intraday liquidity
is, however, poorly understood. To obtain a better idea of the costs associated with real-time
gross settlement, we develop a general equilibrium model of a RTGS payment system. In our
model, liquidity constraints imposed by RTGS can delay trading and settlement. The costs  of
such delays, in turn, arise from the model’s underlying preferences and technologies. We also
use the model to examine the effects of various mechanisms for provision of intraday credit. Our
analysis highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the two most common approaches by
central banks to managing intraday credit, i.e., requiring full collateralization and charging inter-
est. We also show how another types of policy, i.e., requiring only partial collateralization of in-
traday credit, is able to counteract the liquidity constraints imposed by RTGS and may thus offer
another useful approach in this area.
I. Literature Review
Recent developments in large-value payment systems have generated a large body of re-
search. A comprehensive literature review is presented in Angelini (1998). Below, we briefly
review some papers whose subject or approach overlaps closely with ours.3
Furfine and Stehm (1998) also consider the design of a RTGS payments system. In their
setup, the central bank’s intraday credit policy may incorporate pricing of intraday credit, quan-
tity limits on credit, and either full or partial collateralization. Optimal credit policy balances the
costs of stricter credit policies (gridlock and collateral costs) against the costs associated with
more liberal credit policies (increased credit risk), where these costs are incorporated into re-
duced-form functions. The optimal credit policy varies with the relative weights ofeach type of
cost.
Angelini (1998) shows that RTGS, when combined with the insufficient availability of
intraday credit, can result in an interbank coordination problem. Liquidity constraints and uncer-
tainty about incoming payment flows induce a form of payments “gridlock.” Banks delay out-
going payments in the hope of reducing their liquidity demands by receiving early payments.
Such delays lead to an inefficient aggregate increase in the precautionary demand for reserves.
Imposing RTGS can thus impose liquidity costs and result in payment delay. A similar type of
setup is analyzed by Kobayakawa (1997). In Kobayakawa’s model, delay of payments is an
equilibrium outcome when intraday credit is priced but not subject to a collateral requirement.
Delays are avoided when intraday credit is collateralized, but collateralization imposes additional
costs on banks. Hence, choice of intraday credit policy under RTGS involves a tradeoff between
potential costs of delay and the costs of collateral.
The papers cited above each consider the design of an RTGS system within the context of
static models of a banking system, in which the real return on money and on certain other types
of assets is taken as exogenous. This feature must be seen as a limitation in calculating the true
welfare cost associated with central banks’ intraday credit policies. Since intraday expansion and
contraction of a central bank’s balance sheet amounts to a very high-frequency variation in4
monetary policy, we would expect prices to adjust in response to changes in the availability of
intraday credit.
Possible consequences of allowing prices to vary over the short run are suggested by the
analysis of Champ et al. (1996), who construct a monetary model of 19
th century bank panics.
4
Banks in their model are subject to a seasonal (measured in months, not hours) pattern of fluc-
tuations in deposit outflows. If banks have access to free seasonal (“intra-year”) credit by virtue
of their ability to print circulating notes, then nominal interest rates are constant, seasonal
changes in the demand for notes are reflected in price changes, and the resulting equilibrium al-
location is Pareto-optimal. When banks are credit-constrained by an inability to print notes, then
nominal interest rates fluctuate seasonally, seasonal patterns in prices are reversed, real returns
are distorted, delays in payments occur, and the resulting allocation is inefficient.
While the analysis of Champ et al. (1996) is specifically applied to 19
th century institu-
tions, recently a number of papers have adapted neoclassical models of money the analysis of
contemporary payment systems.
5 In each of these models, restricting central bank credit within a
“trading period” often leads to distortions and efficiency losses. Lacker (1997) explicitly models
a second-best problem of setting intraday credit policy, given an inflationary overnight monetary
policy. In Lacker’s model, intraday credit policy matters because an RTGS requirement is im-
posed on banks during a part of the day when they lack full access to credit markets. In cases
where the RTGS constraint binds, bank customers are in effect credit-constrained, causing them
to suboptimally reallocate consumption from one day to the next. Intraday provision of central
bank credit can partially reverse the effects of these credit constraints.
Similar results are obtained in a model developed by Freeman (1996b) and extended by
Green (1997). In the Freeman-Green model, intraday credit constraints arise due to agents’ pat-5
terns of spatial separation. The effects of these credit constraints can be completely reversed (in a
model without risk) if the central bank provides free overdrafts (Freeman) or allows for net set-
tlement by a private clearinghouse (Green).
Below, we develop a model that focuses on the intraday effects of RTGS-induced liquid-
ity constraints. We divide each trading day into “morning” and “afternoon” segments, and then
studying the effects of RTGS on intraday allocations. We examine a standard neoclassical
monetary model in an environment that forces a sharp distinction between intraday and overnight
trading. Since the model environment does not incorporate uncertainty, it can be constructed so
that the imposition of real-time gross settlement can result in trading delays without payment
gridlock or even queues. While gridlock and queues are potentially important problems for a
payment system, their occurrence is not necessary for RTGS to result in welfare costs. Instead,
we demonstrate such costs can arise simply from disturbances to intraday patterns of trade.
II. The Environment
Consider an overlapping generations environment where each generation is of constant
size. Time is discrete and infinite, and there is no uncertainty. In order to analyze issues con-
cerning intraday credit provision, time periods are divided into “mornings” (odd periods) and
“afternoons” (even periods). Mornings and afternoons are classified as into trading “days.” A
new generation is born every day and lives for three periods—two afternoons and the morning in
between, as depicted in Figure 1. Agents do not consume in the first period of their lives and do
not produce in the last period. An agent’s utility is described by the function
Ul UlV c V c ()() ( ) ( ) 11 12 2 3 -+ -+ + a (1)6
Above, c denotes consumption and l denotes labor in the indicated period of the agent’s life. The
functions U and V are increasing, concave, twice continuously differentiable, and have sufficient
curvature so that indifference curves do not cross the axes. The parameter a Î(,) 01  is a discount
factor that reflects agents’ inherent preference for morning consumption.
Agents are endowed with one unit of labor in the first two periods of life. One unit of la-
bor in any period produces one unit of consumption in the same period. To give agents an incen-
tive to trade, there are standard taboos against consuming one’s own production. Note that agents
can only produce afternoon goods while young, but only wish to consume afternoon goods when
old. During the second afternoon of life, an old agent is willing to consume goods produced by
any young agent, and the old agent views all such goods as perfect substitutes. In the mornings,
the agent’s preferences are more specific. We assume that each generation is divided into N
groups of equal size, where N is at least three. Each agent of group n wishes to consume only
“morning goods” of the type produced by group n+1 (mod N). The technology for trading such
that agents can only purchase one type of commodity and sell one type of commodity during the
morning. Imposing this restriction precludes arrangements in which agents achieve settlement by
buying and selling all types of goods. The purchase and sale take place simultaneously, so there
is no uncertainty concerning the timing of agents’ trades. This is more drastic than necessary, but
it is useful for expositional purposes, since it will make clear that “gridlock” is not necessary for
frictions to arise under RTGS.
Morning goods can also be transformed into afternoon goods using a costless intraday
storage technology. In order to focus our analysis on intraday effects, we assume that afternoon
goods cannot be stored for the next morning. In other words, agents can postpone delivery of a7
good from morning to afternoon without physical storage costs, but delivery cannot be postponed
until the following day.
II.A. Walrasian equilibrium
To establish a benchmark case, we describe an efficient steady-state allocation in the
economy. We do this by calculating the steady-state equilibrium allocation of a Walrasian econ-
omy, in which some of the trading frictions described above are relaxed (i.e., imagine that agents
can produce and consume during the same afternoon, and there are double coincidences during
mornings). In this case, the economy effectively becomes a sequence of static economies.
If there were no possibility of intraday storage, then the unique Walrasian steady-state
equilibrium is found by maximizing the agents’ utility (1) subject to the following budget con-
straint:
6
pc pc wl wl 22 33 1 1 2 2 +£ + (2)
where p and w represent the price of consumption and labor, respectively. First-order conditions
are
¢ -= ¢ -= ¢ = ¢ Ul w Ul w V c pV c p ( )/ ( )/ ( )/ ( )/ 11 11 22 22 33 a (3)
The production function requires that
wp 22 = (4)
wp 13 = (5)
The market clearing conditions are
lc 22 = (6)
lc 13 = (7)





















Substituting market-clearing conditions (6)-(7) into (8) yields cc 23 > , which from (3) implies
pp 23 > .
Now we return to the case where intraday storage is allowed. Then in Walrasian equilib-
rium, conditions (2) and (3) are unchanged and the market clearing conditions become
pp 23 ³ (9)
cl 22 £ (10)
with complementary slackness, and
ccll 23 1 2 +£ + (11)
The intuition for condition (9) is no arbitrage.
Recall that 0 1 << a , so that there is an inherent preference for consumption of morning
goods. Thus, market-clearing condition (10) will bind, and conditions (10) and (11) reduce to (6)
and (7). Hence equation (8) holds in the case with storage, implying:
Lemma 1. In the first-best allocation, the consumption of the morning good exceeds the con-
sumption of the afternoon good, i.e.,
cc 23
** > (12)
The shadow price of the morning good also exceeds the shadow price of the afternoon good, i.e.,
¢ > ¢ Vc Vc () ()
**
23 a (13)
III. Exchange under RTGS
Suppose that the trade frictions described above are now in effect, and further suppose
the existence of a constant per capita amount of outside fiat money, denoted M. For the moment,9
suppose that money is the only outside claim on the economy. In this environment, the banking
system exists merely as a device for clearing and settling payments. Money exists only in the
form of electronic claims on a central bank and all payments are made via the central bank’s
clearinghouse. The clearinghouse operates under a “pure” form of RTGS, in which all payments
made via the clearinghouse must be in the form of (electronic) transfers of outside money, and
the central bank grants no credit to its members. In the tradition of the “monetary” literature on
payments arrangements (see Section 1) we also assume that goods and money must change
hands simultaneously. And, since our goal is to consider policy environments where net settle-
ment is excluded in principle, agents are also prohibited from netting exchanges of goods among
themselves.
7 Thus, for labor in period 1 the agent receives fiat money which he may spend in
period 2 (or store until period 3). For labor in period 2 he receives fiat money which he may
spend in period 3.
Under RTGS each agent’s budget set is constrained as
Mw l £ 11 (14)
pc M 22£ (15)
pc pc wl M 22 33 2 2 +£+ (16)
Note that constraint (15), the RTGS constraint, serves as an intraday cash-in-advance constraint
that limits the agent’s purchases of the morning good c2 up to the value of the afternoon good l1
that he produced the previous afternoon. If (15) binds, then after substitution from (4)-(5) agents’

























It is easy to show that the first-best allocation of Section I cannot obtain under RTGS.
Constraints (14) and (15) imply that amount of funds available for the purchase of the morning
good cannot exceed earnings from the previous afternoon, that is
pc wl 22 1 1 £ (18)
In steady-state equilibrium, earnings on afternoon production is less than or equal to expendi-
tures on afternoon goods, i.e.,
wl pc 11 3 3 £ (19)
It follows that in equilibrium, expenditures on morning goods cannot exceed expenditures on af-
ternoon goods, i.e.,
pc pc 22 33 £ (20)
Note that (20) cannot hold for ( , ) ( , )
** cc cc 23 23 = , since from Lemma 1, the first-best allocation
requires cc 23
** >  and  pp 23 > . Hence the first-best outcome is not attainable under RTGS with a
constant money stock and no intraday credit. More specifically, we can show:
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is a constant stock of money, and that the clearinghouse oper-
ates under RTGS with no intraday credit. Then the resulting steady-state equilibrium allocation
must be inefficient, and in particular either (1) the equilibrium consumption of the morning good
must be less than the equilibrium consumption of the afternoon good, or (2) the prices of the two
goods are equal.
Proof: Non-satiation implies that constraint (14) must bind. From the discussion above, the Wal-
rasian allocation cannot be attained under RTGS, implying that (15) binds and hence that (18)
binds. Suppose that  pp 23 > . It follows that (19) binds, and that (20) holds as an equality, i.e.,
pc pc 22 33 = , which then implies cc 23 < .
Q.E.D.11
In the present environment, the costs of RTGS are manifested in agents’ substitution
away from the more desirable (morning) good and toward the less desirable (afternoon) good,
relative to the first-best case. At the beginning of the trading day, agents anticipate incoming
payments from sale of their own morning goods, but cannot borrow against this future income,
which discourages consumption of the morning good. An inefficient allocation results.
The impact of the RTGS constraint is also reflected in the cycle of real interest rates over
the trading day. From Lemma 1, the first-best allocation requires that the net real return on
money be positive overnight (i.e., (/) pp 2310 ->) and negative from morning to afternoon. In
contrast to the results of Champ et al. (1996), no-arbitrage condition (9) guarantees that this
qualitative pattern of real interest rates is sometimes preserved under RTGS, i.e., for the case
where pp 23 > . However, in this case the quantitative effect of the RTGS constraint is to dampen
the cycle of real rates over the trading day. For the case where  pp 23 = , real rates are constant
and equal to zero over the trading day. This case also exhibits “queueing” of transactions over
the day, in the sense that some goods produced in the morning are not delivered until the after-
noon. Queuing is not necessary for RTGS to result in a welfare loss, however.
Since Proposition 1 holds in a stationary economy with a constant money stock, it should
be clear the inefficiency of RTGS does not depend on inflationary (overnight) monetary policy.
Instead, the inefficiency results from a failure of the central bank to accommodate the economy’s
“seasonal” demand for central bank money. Similar results have been shown in Freeman
(1996b), Green (1997), and Lacker (1997). What we have done is to show that the effects of
RTGS can also be manifested in “delay,” i.e., in disruptions of intraday trading patterns.12
III.A. Interest-free daylight overdrafts
The traditional policy of central banks in many countries has been to allow banks access
to free intraday credit, often in the form of overdrafts on their accounts with the central bank.
Formally, we can model this policy in a world with a constant money stock by modifying con-
straints (15) and (16) to allow for overdrafts:
pc M O 22£+ (21)
pc pc wl M O O wl M 22 33 2 2 2 2 +£+ + - =+ () (22)
where O represents the daylight overdraft. Thus, daylight overdrafts effectively loosen the cash-
in-advance constraint (15). If credit is only available up to a fixed amount, then the equilibrium
allocation depends on the amount of credit available.
Suppose that a sufficiently small amount of intraday credit is available, so that constraint



























where w denotes the overdraft-to-money ratio, i.e., w = OM / . We can now show:
Proposition 2. If free daylight overdrafts are limited to an amount 



















then the first-best allocation obtains under RTGS.
Proof: The budget constraint for the afternoon good (14) requires, after substituting conditions
(5) and (7)
pM c 33 = / (25)
From Lemma 1, in the Walrasian economy it must hold that13
p p Vc Vc 23 2 3 /( ) / ( )
** = ¢¢ a (26)
Hence, if the first-best outcome is feasible, then it must be the case that purchases of c2
* can be















































which is equivalent to ( ) ( )
* 11 +£ + ww OO , which is evidently satisfied for 
* ww £ . Hence the
first-best outcome is feasible for ww =
* . It is then straightforward to show that first-order con-
ditions (23) are satisfied for ( , ) ( , )
** cc cc 23 23 = , when ww =
*  and the relative price of morning
goods is given by (26).
Q.E.D.
Thus, free intraday credit allows payment system participants to overcome the credit con-
straints imposed by RTGS, by allowing them to borrow central bank funds against anticipated
payment inflows. In real-world payment systems such flows can be uncertain, however, so
granting intraday credit could expose a central bank to unacceptable levels of credit risk.
IV. Collateralized Intraday Credit
One means by which a central bank could limit its intraday exposure would be to require
collateral in return for access to daylight credit. Below, we analyze policies of this type, where
intraday credit is collateralized by government bonds.
8
We introduce bonds via a standard government budget constraint. Let  Bt  denote the
nominal stock of government bonds as of the afternoon of day (not period) t. For analytical con-
venience, the entire government debt consists of bonds with a maturity of one day. Bonds may be
purchased during the afternoon and mature the following afternoon. Although bonds bear inter-14
est, they do not necessarily dominate money as they cannot be used as a settlement medium be-
fore maturity.
9
The government inherits an initial stock of government debt Bt , and pays this off via
money creation. For simplicity, we assume that the government has no current expenditures or
any other source of revenue, and that the central bank inflates the money stock at a constant rate
m per day. Letting i denote the nominal interest rate, the government budget constraint is given
by
Bi B M M tt t t =+ - - -- () ( ) 1 11 (28)








where b represents the steady-state ratio of debt to money B/M. We require that b > 0, meaning
that the government is indebted to the private sector and not vice versa.
10
IV.A. Full collateralization
Suppose now that agents can run intraday overdrafts on their reserve accounts, but that
each agent’s overdraft is fully collateralized by his bond holdings. Formally, we require
Oi B £+ k () 1 , where k Î[,) 01  is a policy parameter that is set by the central bank. Under such a
policy, an agent’s budget set is constrained as
MBw l +£ 11 (30)
22 pc M O £+ (31)
22 33 2 2 (1 ) pc pc wl M iB +£+ + + (32)15
In the absence of a legal reserve requirement k() 1 + i  must be less than unity (i.e., the central
bank must impose a “haircut” on posted collateral) in order for money not to be dominated by
bonds.
11 Under full collateralization, it is straightforward to show:
Proposition 3. Suppose the clearinghouse operates under RTGS, with intraday credit available
on a fully collateralized basis with 01 1 <+ < k () i . Then any steady-state equilibrium allocation
must be inefficient.
Proof: Constraint (31), together with the collateral requirement, implies
22 (1 ) (1 ) pc M iB M iB k £+ + <+ + (33)
In steady state, the daily rate of increase in prices and in the stock of outside assets is given by
the inflation rate m. Hence
Mi B M B ++ =+ + ()( ) ( ) 11 m (34)
which from (33) and (30) implies
pc M B wl 22 1 1 <+ £ (35)
As in the proof of Proposition 1, this in turn implies
pc pc 22 33 < (36)
The proposition follows since absence of arbitrage requires  pp 23 ³  and efficiency requires
cc 23 > .
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that an RTGS regime of overdrafts with full collateralization causes
agents to face much the same difficulty as under RTGS without overdrafts. That is, agents are
credit constrained because they are unable to obtain full credit against anticipated inflows of
funds. Hence, a regime of RTGS with fully collateralized overdrafts results in an inefficient allo-
cation.16
In policy discussions, the costs of collateralized intraday credit are often associated with
the opportunity costs of holding government bonds as opposed to other types of assets.
12 Propo-
sition 3 shows that such opportunity costs need not exist in order for a full collateralization re-
quirement to impose costs.
Finally, we note that the “haircut” imposed by the central bank on bonds posted as collat-
eral for overdrafts may be expressed in percentage terms as a 100 1
1 () k
- -  percent haircut on the
face value of the collateral. The requirement that k() 1 + i  be less than unity is equivalent to a re-
quirement that the haircut percentage be greater than the overnight nominal interest rate i. Since
agents are credit-constrained for all fractional values of k >i, an efficient allocation would not
occur even in the limiting case.
IV.B. Partial collateralization
We now consider a regime in which intraday credit is only partially collateralized. That
is, the central bank is willing allow overdrafts of reserve accounts up to some multiple of bonds
deposited with the central bank. Formally, this is done by allowing the parameter k to exceed
unity. In this case, money is dominated by bonds, so that agents must be required to hold money
in order for the price level to be determinate. To this end, we impose a legal reserve requirement,
which forces all agents to hold money in a fixed ratio to their bond holdings. Present-value
budget balance requires that in steady state, the required reserve ratio equal the initial ratio of
money to bonds, i.e., 1/b. The reserve requirement can be written as an additional (binding)
constraint on the agent’s budget set, i.e.,
BM = b (37)17
Thus, under partial collateralization, agents seek to maximize their utility (1), subject to budget
constraints (30)-(32) and reserve requirement (37). This is really the same problem as in Section
III.A. above. To see this define  MM M B =+ = + () 1 b  and rewrite (30)-(32) as
MBw l Mw l +£ Û £ 11 1 (38)
22
22
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) pc M O M O
pc M O
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By choosing the right combination of limits on intraday credit k and monetary policy m, the cen-
tral bank can ensure the first-best outcome.
Proposition 4. Under RTGS with partial collateralization, the first-best outcome obtains if the
central bank sets the inflation rate m and the collateralization requirement k to satisfy











* is given in (24).
Proof: Constraints (38)-(40) clearly match up with (14), (21), and (22), so the agents’ problem is
the same as analyzed in Section III.A. From Proposition 2, the first-best allocation obtains when
* () / 1 MOM w +³ + . From (41), this occurs when18









Substituting the budget-balance condition (29) in (43) and solving for k yields (42).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 shows that partial collateralization of intraday credit is compatible with ef-
ficiency. Attainment of the first-best outcome requires coordination in the setting of intraday
credit policy (i.e., in the setting of collateral requirements) and the setting of more traditional
“overnight” policies (i.e., the legal reserve requirement and the growth rate of the money stock).







³+ + ç÷ + èø
(44)
According to (44), efficiency requires a more generous collateralization requirement (a higher k)
for lower levels of the nominal interest rate and for lower levels of government debt.
At first glance, Proposition (4) might appear to offer the central bank a “free lunch.” That
is, a partial collateralization requirement satisfying (42) appears to offer the central bank an op-
portunity to reduce its exposure to payment system participants without simultaneously imposing
liquidity costs. This cannot be the case, however, since the real value of the intraday credit ex-
tended, i.e., the value of the agent’s morning consumption minus the value of his earnings from
the previous afternoon, is the same in Proposition 4 as in Proposition 2. Partial collateralization
does offer the central bank an additional amount of flexibility, i.e., if the central banker chooses a
collateral requirement k greater than unity but not satisfying (42), the welfare loss is reduced,
relative to full collateralization, while the exposure of the central bank is reduced, relative to a
policy of free daylight overdrafts.19
V. Paying Interest on Central Bank Funds Held Overnight
Another possible policy response to the liquidity problems posed by RTGS would be for
the central bank to augment agents’ nominal income by paying interest on reserves held over-
night. Suppose the central bank denies payment system participants access to intraday credit, but
is willing to pay an interest rate i on central bank funds held overnight. To maintain the distinc-
tion between money and bonds in the absence of a reserve requirement, i would have to be less
than the market rate on government debt i.
13 Interest payments on bonds and money are financed
by money creation, so that government budget constraint (28) is replaced by
Bi B Mi M tt t t =+ - -+ -- () () 11 11 1 6 (45)










In this case, budget constraint (14) is replaced by (30) and constraints (31)-(32) become:
22 (1 ) pc iM £+ (47)
22 33 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) pc pc wl iM iB + £ ++ ++ (48)
Formally, we can show:
Proposition 5. If the central bank pays an interest rate on reserves less than the inflation rate,
then under RTGS without intraday credit the resulting equilibrium allocation must be inefficient.
Proof: Follows exactly the steps in the proof of Proposition 3, and is omitted.
Current U.S. policy does not allow for payment of interest on reserves. By making ag-
gressive use of “sweeps” technology, however, banks have been able to substitute funds in inter-
est-bearing Fed clearing accounts for funds in non-interest-bearing reserve accounts.
14 The effect20
has been “as if” these banks had received interest on part of their reserve accounts. Proposition 5
shows that such changes cannot completely undo the effects of intraday liquidity constraints.
VI. Charging Interest on Daylight Overdrafts
In the U.S., efforts to limit the Fed’s intraday credit exposure have emphasized charging
an administered interest rate (or “fees”) for daylight overdrafts rather than collateralization.
15 In
this section we consider the effects of such policies. Suppose that the central bank charges an
interest rate of t or fees of tO on morning overdrafts of O, and that the fees incurred on a given
day are payable by the close of business (in the afternoon). Under such a regime, budget con-
straints for the agent’s problem are given by equation (30), together with the constraints
22 pc M O £+ (49)
22 33 2 2 (1 ) pc pc wl M iB O t +£+ + + - (50)
We will analyze the case where the interest rate on intraday overdrafts does not exceed
the nominal interest rate on bonds, and where the legal reserve requirement (37) is in force. Note
that if the interest rate on intraday overdrafts exceeds the interest rate on bonds, then overdrafts
will never be used, since using overdrafts would be dominated by holding additional money bal-
ances. In practice, the interest rate on overdrafts (currently 27 basis points at an annual rate in the
U.S.) is well below the interest rate on bonds. In the model, such a situation would cause money
to be dominated by bonds in the absence of a legal reserve requirement.
Interest paid on daylight overdrafts is used to pay off the government debt. The appropri-










If there is no intraday storage in equilibrium, so that  pp 23 > , then first-order conditions reduce
















































From (54) it is clear that for each intraday interest rate t there are a large number of possible
equilibria, each indexed by the overdraft-to-money ratio w. We can also show:
Proposition 6. Suppose that RTGS is in effect and that the central bank makes intraday credit
freely available at a fixed interest rate t > 0. Then the resulting equilibrium allocation is ineffi-
cient, but approaches the efficient allocation as t0.
Proof: If  pp 23 =  in equilibrium, then by Lemma 1 this is inconsistent with the first-best alloca-
tion. So suppose that  pp 23 > . In this case, comparing (53) and (54) with (8) yields cc 22 <
*  and
cc 33 >
*  for positive t. Driving t0 causes (53) and (54) to approach (8).
Q.E.D.
Thus, the first-best allocation is unattainable under a policy of charging fees on daylight
credit, but is approximately attainable for small values of the intraday interest rate. Of course, as
the interest rate decreases, the central bank’s exposure is likely to increase.
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VII. Conclusions
Above, we have presented a general equilibrium model of a payment system that operates
under real-time gross settlement, in which the liquidity constraints imposed by RTGS result in
settlement delays. Under “pure” RTGS, the resulting equilibrium allocation is inefficient, even
though there is no uncertainty and no gridlock associated with settlement (Proposition 1). In-
stead, the inefficiency of RTGS stems from its implicit credit constraints. Granting payment
system participants access to intraday credit from the central bank eases the effects of these
credit constraints (Proposition 2), but may also result in unacceptably large intraday exposures
on the part of the central bank.
Policy responses to this problem have generally stressed either (1) full collateralization of
overdraft positions, or (2) charging interest on daylight credit. The analysis above suggests that
while there is some merit in both types of policies, both are also flawed along some dimension.
Allowing intraday credit only under full collateralization eliminates the daylight exposure of the
central bank, and but cannot completely eliminate the effects of liquidity constraints imposed by
RTGS (Proposition 3). Likewise, a policy of paying interest on reserves cannot undo these li-
quidity constraints (Proposition 5). Interest rates on daylight overdrafts can be adjusted to im-
prove efficiency, but will simultaneously affect the central bank’s intraday exposure (Proposition
6).
Our analysis does point to an approach that merits further investigation. A policy of par-
tial collateralization of intraday credit, which when combined with the “right” choice of mone-
tary policy, can allow a central bank to trade off the effects of liquidity constraints  against intra-
day exposure (Proposition 4). Partial collateralization has been an important component of cen-23
tral banks’ regulation of payment networks that settle on a net basis, but has not been extensively
discussed in reference to RTGS systems.
17
These conclusions are obviously tentative, since the analysis above abstracts from a
number of important aspects of real-world payment systems. For example, uncertainty regarding
payment flows and greater heterogeneity of payment system participants could work against the
effectiveness of collateral requirements, unless these could be adjusted dynamically to match
market conditions. On the other hand, the presence of credit risk and moral hazard might work
against a system based on charging intraday interest, since relatively unfettered access to central
bank credit could have negative incentive effects. The presence of other distorting taxes (i.e.,
other than the inflation tax on overnight central bank funds) might argue for higher intraday
rates. Finally, the welfare calculations would be considerably complicated if intraday credit were
also available over private payment networks.24
Appendix: General Characterization of Efficient Allocations
In general, any sequence of productions and consumptions
(,, , )
,,, . . . llcc ii i i i 12 2 3 123 ;@ = (54)
(where i refers to the generation) is efficient if it has the following properties:
l i 1 0 = (55)
and for all i
¢ -= ¢ UlV c ii ()( ) 1 22 (56)
lc ii 22 ³  and  ¢ ³ ¢ Vc Vc ii () () 23 a (57)
ll c c ii i i 11 2 2 3 ++=+ (58)
To each efficient allocation corresponds a sequence of prices {( , , , )} wwp p iiii 1223
wp ii 22 = (59)
lc ii 22 ³  and  pp ii 23 ³ (60)
(with complementary slackness)
llcc ii i i 12 2 3 +=+ (61)
In the general case, the condition guaranteeing that lc ii 22 =  is binding is now more complicated,
since it involves the relative welfare weights placed on the consecutive generations. However,
the basic message is unaffected.25
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1 For basic information Fedwire and CHIPS, see Bank for International Settlements (1993). Data
on daily payment volumes are 1997 averages from Bank for International Settlements (1998).
2 See, e.g., Bank for International Settlements (1997), Folkerts-Landau et al. (1997), or Emmons
(1997).
3 See e.g., Evanoff (1989).
4 Their model shares many features with that of Sargent and Wallace (1982).
5 In addition to the papers discussed below, see Freeman (1996a, 1999) and Kim (1997).
6 We follow Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Champ et al. (1996) in restricting our attention to
steady states. The steady-state equilibrium allocation of the Walrasian economy corresponds to
the solution of the social planner’s problem in the “golden rule” case where every generation’s
welfare receives equal weight in the planner’s objective. More general characterizations of effi-
cient allocations are given in the Appendix.
7 In payments industry jargon, such an arrangement is known as a “BIS Model 1 Delivery-
versus-Payment (DVP)” system; see Emmons (1997) for a discussion.
8 Many central banks have historically made intraday credit available on a fully collateralized,
zero-fee basis. See Bank for International Settlements (1997, Annex I). The European Central
Bank currently offers Euro-denominated intraday credit for its RTGS system under similar
terms. See European Central Bank (1998). By 2001, the Bank of Japan will also offer zero-fee,
collateralized intraday credit over its RTGS system; see Bank of Japan (1997).
9 Here, a key feature of bonds is not that they mature in the afternoon, but that their term to ma-
turity (daily) is less than the frequency at which agents would like to trade (intraday).29
                                                                                                                                                            
10 As Lacker (1997) points out, constraints imposed by RTGS would vanish if bonds could be
sold short in arbitrary amounts.
11 In practice, haircuts are imposed on virtually all forms of collateral.
12 See, e.g., Folkerts-Landau et al. (1997, 40-41).
13 In practice, central banks that pay interest on overnight balances pay slightly less than the in-
terbank overnight rate. See, e.g., Borio (1997).
14 The terms “sweeps” is used for computer programs that automatically move or “sweep” funds
from reservable to non-reservable accounts.
15 Fees are assessed for daylight overdrafts that exceed pre-set caps. See Emmons (1997, 28) for
a summary of Federal Reserve policy on daylight overdrafts.
16 For an empirical investigation of the sensitivity of payments volume to intraday interest rates
on Fedwire, see Hancock and Wilcox (1996).
17 Partial collateralization is an important component of the “Lamfalussy standards” for net set-
tlement systems. See Bank for International Settlements (1990). Implications of the partial col-
lateralization requirement are discussed in Emmons (1997) and Kahn and Roberds (1998).